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AEC ASEAN Economic Community
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARMM Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
BIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BPO Business Process Outsourcing
CCT Conditional Cash Transfer
CIL Country Insights Lab
CODE-NGO Caucus of Development NGO Networks
CPP Communist Party of the Philippines
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIDA Geographically Isolated and Disadvantaged Areas 
GK Gawad Kalinga
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
ISL Institute for Societal Leadership
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA New People’s Army
OFW Overseas Filipino Worker
PCNC Philippines Council for NGO Certification
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PDAF Priority Development Assistance Fund
PEF Peace and Equity Foundation
PHP Philippine Peso
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PNP Philippine National Police
PPP Public-Private Partnership
PPPP Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipina Program
SE Social Enterprise
SIO Social Impact Organisation
SMU Singapore Management University
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
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III. About the Country Insights Lab Series 
The Institute for Societal Leadership conducted a series of eleven Country Insights 
Labs (CILs) in select Southeast Asian cities between June 2014 and June 2015. 
Each CIL aimed to uncover the critical social and environmental issues facing 
leaders from business, government and civil society in a given country and frame 
the underlying causes behind each issue within the country’s context. The study 
identified emerging trends in Southeast Asia and has since directed further re-
search toward interconnected social and environmental issues shared among 
countries in the region. 
Additionally, ISL research staff investigated the day-to-day organisational chal-
lenges faced by social impact organisations (SIOs) in each Southeast Asian coun-
try. We broadly defined an SIO as any organisation with the capacity to contribute 
to the betterment of communities. These included, but were not limited to, phil-
anthropic organisations, corporate foundations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), activist groups, social enterprises and impact investors. Interviews fo-
cussed on challenges associated with funding models, human resources, tax in-
centives, legal frameworks and government registration processes. In total, re-
search staff interviewed 237 organisations and 293 individuals, including govern-
ment officials, business leaders, philanthropists, NGO workers, social entrepre-
neurs, media professionals and academics. The interviews themselves consisted of 
questions relating to organisational history, operations, strategic outlook, cross-
sector collaboration, leadership and country context.  1
The Institute did not intend the CIL series to be exhaustive or to produce statisti-
cally significant data. On the contrary, the series was a qualitative study that em-
ployed interviews and market insights as a means of understanding an increasing-
ly complex landscape. As one of the world’s most diverse regions, Southeast Asia 
is home to an array of cultures, languages, religions and economic levels of devel-
opment. At the cornerstone of each country study is a belief that workable solu-
tions and partnerships depend on an awareness of how each country’s unique 
context relates to its social issues. 
The ISL research team conducted interviews in Metro Manila between 4–6 March 
2015. 
 For a list of sample questions, see section VI. 1
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IV. The Philippines  
A. Historical Background 
Although Western colonisers have, to varying 
degrees, shaped the political structures and 
economies of nearly all modern Southeast Asian 
nations, they achieved an unmatched level of cul-
tural and institutional penetration in the Philip-
pines. Far from the Indic influences that inspired 
Angkor Wat, Borobudur and Bagan, the island 
group was only marginally sanskritised during the 
pre-colonial period. With some notable excep-
tions in the south, Muslim communities were also 
never able to establish firm roots. Mindanao, Sulu 
and even southern Luzon were home to maritime 
sultanates beginning in the late 14th century, but a 
Spanish victory over the Muslim Rajah of Maynila 
in 1571 effectively halted widespread adoption of 
Islam throughout the archipelago. More than 
three centuries of Spanish rule have left a pro-
found mark on the culture, language and religion 
of the Filipinos, while the subsequent half-century 
of American administration has largely defined 
the structure of their country’s political and legal 
institutions.  
For the first two centuries of colonial rule, the 
Philippines was primarily a way station in imperial 
Spain’s expansive mercantile empire. Each year, 
the government-operated Casa de Contratación 
in Seville dutifully dispatched a treasure galleon 
from Acapulco to Manila to buy up Chinese 
porcelains and silks with a tightly controlled sup-
ply of Mexican gold and silver. It was only in the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century that the 
imperial government lifted bans on commercial 
plantations and opened Manila to foreign ship-
ping. The 1800s saw the emergence of a pro-
vincial gentry composed of export-oriented 
planters and entrepreneurs with firm controls 
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The Philippines By Numbers
Surface Area: 
300,000 sq km
Population:
96.71 million [2012]
Population Density:
322.4 per sq km
Population of Metro Manila:
11.86 million
Urban Population:
49.3% [2013]
Currency:
Philippines Peso (PHP)
GDP (Nominal):
US$250.18 billion [2012]
Growth Rate:
6.8% [2012]
GDP Per Capita:
US$2,587.00 [2012]
Unemployment:
7.0% [2012]
Tourist Arrivals Annually:
4.27 million [2012]
Mobile-Cellular Subscriptions:
106.8 per 100 inhabitants [2012]
Individuals Using Internet:
36.2% [2012]
Life Expectancy at Birth:
Females (72.2 years); Males (65.3 years)
Forested Area:
25.9% [2011]
Source: UN Data (http://data.un.org)
over extractive industries such as tobacco, indigo, 
hemp and sugar.   2
Economic policy during the American administra-
tion (1899–1946) cemented the Philippines’ role 
as an exporter of raw materials and gave the es-
tablished gentry additional opportunities to con-
solidate economic and political power. By 1902, 
the U.S. Congress had liquidated plantations run 
by the Catholic Church and sold lands held by the 
friars at public auctions. By 1913, it had removed 
all quota restrictions on Philippine exports to the 
United States. Trade with the U.S. ballooned from 
US$38 million in 1908 to US$257 million in 1929.  3
In spite of intermittent American attempts to limit 
landholdings and confer land patents on new 
owners, established elites were the primary buy-
ers of publicly auctioned land and by extension 
the chief beneficiaries of the 1920s trade boom. 
As the colonial government also set about inau-
gurating democratic institutions in its colony, in-
cluding locally elected municipal and provincial 
offices, a bicameral legislature modelled after the 
U.S. Congress and a supreme court, these same 
families rose to occupy the newly opened political 
positions. Many of today’s political elites, includ-
ing Benigno Aquino III, Imelda Marcos and Ed-
uardo “Danding” Cojuangco among others, be-
long to rival political dynasties that can trace their 
roots back to the American colonial period. 
A provincial oligarchy chiefly composed of aristo-
cratic planter families dominated Philippine polit-
ical life after the colony gained independence in 
1946. The Ferdinand Marcos regime (1965–86) 
altered, but did not dismantle, the oligarchical 
elite. Although Marcos significantly curbed the 
power of rural aristocrats, he awarded govern-
ment contracts to a new set of would-be oligarchs 
based on their proximity to the Marcos family. In 
particular, like Suharto in Indonesia, he co-opted 
politically isolated Filipino-Chinese financiers, 
including John Gokongwei, Henry Sy and Lucio 
Tan. Since the fall of the Marcos regime, former 
government cronies have competed for power 
with both resurgent rural aristocratic families as 
well as populist celebrities such as Joseph Estra-
da, Manny Pacquio and Loren Legarda. 
The political economy of the Philippines has re-
volved around rent-seeking and clientelism since 
the colonial period. Politicians have largely used 
elected offices to secure for family members and 
supporters private access to state resources, in-
cluding low-cost government credit, licenses for 
state-regulated enterprises and selective en-
forcement of commercial regulations.  Voters 4
have also expected political victors to dole out 
direct benefits in the form of cash grants, tax-
breaks on commodities, local infrastructure 
projects or other pork barrel. Political patronage 
systems can support significant economic and 
developmental growth when paired with en-
forced market discipline—as Indonesia, South Ko-
rea and Thailand have demonstrated. However, 
the near constant shifts in power and patronage 
that accompany each election cycle in the Philip-
pines has largely stymied any attempts to build an 
industrialised export economy. Between 1986 
and 2009, the Philippines economy grew on aver-
age only 3.86 percent each year.  5
With the above in mind, the election of Benigno 
“NoyNoy” Aquino III in 2010 has brought a new-
found optimism to Filipino and foreign investors. 
In spite of a sluggish start in 2011, the Philippines 
under Aquino posted 6.8 and 7.2 percent growth 
in 2012 and 2013 respectively.  Recent gains 6
were the result of several factors, including in-
creased government and private-sector spending 
 Josep M. Fradera, “The Historical Origins of the Philippine Economy: A Survey of Recent of Recent Research on the Spanish Colonial Era,” 2
Australian Economic History Review 44.3 (November 2004), 309.
 D.R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia, Fifth Ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 164.3
 Alfred W. McCoy, An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 10.4
 “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank, accessed 10 May 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/.5
 Ibid.6
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on infrastructure projects, a robust peso via the 
sale of PHP-denominated bonds, a rise in over-
seas remittances and a boom in business process 
outsourcing (BPO) operations.  Aquino’s anti-cor7 -
ruption initiatives have also encouraged global 
investment rating firms, such as Fitch Service Rat-
ing, Standard and Poor and Moody’s Investors 
Service, to upgrade the Philippines, indicating 
that the government and local corporations could 
potentially attract much needed foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the coming years.  
While Philippines urban centres, especially Metro 
Manila and Cebu City, have become lucrative 
hubs for BPO-related industries, the Aquino ad-
ministration still faces significant developmental 
challenges in the countryside. Each post-Marcos 
administration has made poverty eradication a 
keystone of its electoral platform, but 19 percent 
of Filipinos continue to live on less than US$1.25 
per day. An additional 22.7 percent live on less 
than US$2 per day.  32 percent of Filipinos are 8
engaged in agricultural activities, but inadequate 
rural infrastructure and competition from more 
developed markets with better economies of 
scale have trapped small-scale farmers in a cycle 
of high-interest crop loans and crippling debt.  9
The Philippines also lags behind in achieving sev-
eral of its Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). A report published by the Overseas De-
velopment Institute in 2010 disclosed that the 
Philippines had a child mortality rate of 28 per 
1,000 live births and that 28 percent of children 
under five years of age were malnourished and/or 
underweight.   10
President Aquino has aggressively pursued de-
velopment issues during his term. He has tabled a 
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health 
Act in Congress against threats of excommunica-
tion by the Catholic Church and encouraged an 
upcoming bevy of progressive legislation pushed 
by his nephew, Paolo Benigno “Bam” Aquino IV. 
He has also opened up tenders for Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) with international and local 
corporations in order to renovate vital in-
frastructure projects, including light rail, water 
supply, sewage systems and agricultural storage 
facilities.  That said, a prominent 2013 scandal 11
involving money channelled from the govern-
ment’s Priority Development Assistance Fund 
(PDAF) to ersatz Non-Governmental Organisa-
tions (NGOs) run by congress members, including 
some members of Aquino’s Liberal party, has re-
cently turned middle-class support against devel-
opment programmes in rural provinces. Aquino 
will be ineligible to run for a second term in the 
upcoming 2016 election, and it is still unclear 
whether his administration can recover the sup-
port necessary to push through its development 
agenda during his remaining years in power. 
B. Current Challenges 
❖ Inadequate infrastructure development and 
increasing vulnerability to recurrent natural disas-
ters. A combination of geography and underde-
veloped infrastructure on remote islands has ren-
dered the Philippines one of the most disaster-
vulnerable countries in Southeast Asia in recent 
years. In addition to being situated on the volcano 
and earthquake-prone “ring of fire,” the island 
group is also exposed to tropical cyclones origi-
nating from the equatorial Pacific. Large urban 
centres are often located directly on the coast, 
placing millions of inhabitants at risk for storm 
surges and tsunamis. Typhoons can also dislodge 
loosely-packed mud from the more than twenty-
three active volcanoes in the Philippines, leading 
to deadly lahar flows capable of burying entire 
 Renata Cruz De Castro, “The Philippines in 2013: Popular President Confronts Daunting Challenges,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2014), 247–7
48.
 “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank.8
 CIA World Factbook, accessed 10 May 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook. 9
 Millennium Development Goals Report Card: Measuring Progress Across Countries (London: Overseas Development Institute Publica10 -
tions, 2010), 38, 83.
 “After a False Start, Philippine Public-Private Partnership Projects Find Spark,” International Finance Corporation, 5 January 2012, accessed 11
10 May 2015, http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region__ext_content/regions/east+asia+and+the+pacific/news/after+a+false+start,
+philippine+public-private+partnership+projects+find+spark. 
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villages. It is estimated that between 2004 and 
2008, the Philippines lost 0.5% of its GDP each 
year as a result of natural disasters.  12
Increasing atmospheric temperatures worldwide 
have resulted in the recent appearance of tropical 
storms of unprecedented ferocity—so-called “su-
per typhoons.” In fact, eight of the ten most de-
structive typhoons to strike the Philippines have 
made landfall within the last seven years. In 2009, 
typhoons Parma (known locally as Pepeng) and 
Ketsana (Ondoy) devastated Luzon, causing over 
PHP 38 billion in combined damages.  Typhoon 13
Haiyan (Yolanda), the strongest tropical cyclone to 
make landfall in recorded history, pummelled the 
Visayas between 7 and 9 November 2013. In a 
matter of days, it demolished Tacloban, the capi-
tal of Leyte province, and moved on to the islands 
of Panay, Cebu and Palawan, killing more than 
6,000 people and leaving more than three million 
homeless. It also destroyed farmlands and fish-
ponds totalling a staggering 12 percent of the 
country’s GDP.  14
Prior to Typhoon Haiyan’s landfall, the in-
ternational community, including the United Na-
tions, had praised the Philippines government for 
its commitment to minimising disaster risk. Both 
the 2009 Climate Change Act and the 2010 Disas-
ter Risk Reduction and Management Act created 
a number of government bodies responsible for 
developing comprehensive strategies for manag-
ing potential crises precipitated by natural disas-
ters. However, Typhoon Haiyan exposed severe 
deficiencies in the government’s disaster pre-
paredness measures, with the national govern-
ment largely failing to coordinate with its local 
counterparts. According to the new framework, 
local governments were responsible for purchas-
ing health and safety equipment, funding emer-
gency services such as firefighters and develop-
ing infrastructure such as flood control systems 
and seawalls. However, provincial and municipal 
authorities were caught significantly unprepared 
for the destruction wrought by Haiyan.   15
For Tacloban in particular, a failure to enforce a 
mandatory evacuation led to the majority of 
deaths, as residents crowded into low-lying struc-
tures made of corrugated steel that were unable 
to withstand the storm. The island’s already fragile 
infrastructure was also largely obliterated, com-
plicating the delivery of food, water and medicine 
after the storm had passed. A more comprehen-
sive and inclusive disaster preparedness scheme 
with local businesses, local government offices 
and civil society organisations as active stake-
holders can prevent repeats of large-scale de-
struction.  
❖ Lack of local opportunities for skilled and un-
skilled labour and increasing vulnerability of 
some overseas workers to exploitation and traf-
ficking. No report on the Philippines would be 
complete without a discussion of overseas Fil-
ipino workers (OFWs) and the wider Filipino dias-
pora. Political persecution and financial insecurity 
associated with the Marcos regime’s handling of 
the economy initially led significant numbers of 
Filipinos to leave the country in the 1970s and 
1980s, but the Philippines has maintained a “sus-
tained culture of emigration” even in the post-
Marcos era.  By 2006, 38.5 million Filipinos, or 43 16
percent of the population, were dependent on 
some form of overseas remittances, and as much 
as 10 percent of the population was working 
 Patrick Alcantara, “Lessons learned from the Philippine government’s response to Typhoon Haiyan,” Journal of Business Continuity & 12
Emergency Planning 7.4 (April 2014), 335.
 Romulo A. Virola, “The Devastation of Ondoy and Pepeng,” Republic of the Philippines Statistics Authority, accessed on 10 May 2015, 13
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/headlines/StatsSpeak/2009/110 909_rav_mrsr_typhoons.asp.
 Cruz De Castro, 249.14
 Alcantara, 337–338.15
 Diane Sabenacio Nititham, “Migration as Cultural Capital: The Ongoing Dependence on Overseas Filipino Workers,” Malaysian Journal of 16
Economic Studies 48.2 (2011), 188.
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overseas.  In 2012, remittances from OFWs 17
amounted to US$20 billion, or eight percent of 
GDP.    18
There are several factors behind continued emi-
gration. The Philippine economy’s historic re-
liance on agricultural commodities has provided 
few employment opportunities outside basic 
farming jobs. Approximately 10.9 million Filipinos, 
or 30 percent of the population, are either unem-
ployed or underemployed.  For educated mid19 -
dle-class Filipinos in particular, pursuing careers 
abroad has become a means of exchanging en-
trenched patronage systems and relatively low-
wages for increased autonomy and financial secu-
rity.  Since 1975, successive Filipino govern20 -
ments have encouraged emigration as a means of 
repaying foreign debts owed to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
Some experts have raised concerns that contin-
ued reliance on overseas remittances stymies 
development of local industries, increases in-
equality between “haves” and “have-nots” and 
contributes to cultural and familial erosion.  Hu21 -
man rights groups have also brought attention to 
the inadequate work conditions faced by many 
Filipino domestic workers abroad in Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Arab Gulf states as well as their 
vulnerability to traffickers. In 2010, Human Rights 
Watch reported that significant numbers of Fil-
ipino maids working in Kuwait were forced to 
work 18-hour work days, starved and subjected to 
physical abuse by their employers.  The 2015 22
case against Indonesian death-row Mary Jane 
Veloso for possession of narcotics raised further 
concerns about the transnational domestic work-
ers’ industry. Veloso alleged that she was initially 
offered a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia, 
only to be sent to Yogyakarta after her recruiter 
had given her a bag concealing illegal narcotics.  23
  
In the long run, sustainable and equitable growth 
will require the Philippine government to work 
with local and foreign investors to provide local 
economic opportunities at home. In the mean-
time, maintaining OFW safety requires the active 
participation of government regulators, human 
rights organisations and overseas businesses. In 
addition to channeling foreign earnings to public 
coffers via supplementary taxes on OFWs, the 
Philippine government has instituted various of-
fices and initiatives to protect overseas workers. 
There are also numerous NGOs and international 
organisations actively involved in protecting 
workers’ rights oversea such as the following: 
• Human Rights Watch  
• Overseas Workers Welfare Association 
• UN Office of the High Comm. for Human Rights  
• First Philippine Overseas Workers Foundation 
❖ Continuing insurgencies and warlordism in 
remote districts, plus a fraught peace process for 
Bangsamoro. Multiple ethnic or ideological 
groups, including Moro separatists, Islamists and 
Marxists, have waged separate insurgencies 
across the archipelago, at times with international 
support from neighbours, Malaysia and China. 68 
of the Philippines’ 81 provinces experienced at 
least one insurgent attack in 2013.  Provinces 24
destabilised by these subnational conflicts are 
also vulnerable to further violence and political 
intimidation by warlords and paramilitary groups. 
 Ibid., 188, 191.17
 Cruz De Castro, 247.18
 Nititham, 190.19
 Cirila Limpangog, “Migration as a Strategy for Maintaining a Middle-Class Identity: The Case of Professional Filipino Women in 20
Melbourne,” ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 6.2 (2013), 313.
 Nititham, 193.21
 Walls at Every Turn: Abuse of Migrant Domestic Workers through Kuwait’s Sponsorship System (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), 83.22
 Raul Dancel, “Who is the woman behind Filipina Mary Jane Veloso’s last-minute reprieve from execution?” The Straits Times, 14 May 2015, 23
accessed 14 May 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/story/who-the-woman-behind-filipina-mary-jane-velosos-last-
minute-reprieve.
 Global Terrorism Index 2014: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014), 27.24
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The New People’s Army (NPA) initially split off 
from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) 
in 1969 to wage a guerrilla war against the Mar-
cos Regime, but it continues to organise sporadic 
violent activities throughout the country. In the 
last three decades, NPA members have staged 
raids on army garrisons, kidnapped civilians and 
military personnel and assassinated Filipino and 
American military officials. Having lost Chinese 
external support decades ago, the NPA is current-
ly limited to operations near its strongholds in 
Samar, Mindanao and Northern Luzon. Still, it re-
mains a destabilising force throughout the coun-
try and was responsible for 30 percent of terror-
ism-related deaths nationwide in 2013.  The 25
Aquino administration has been negotiating for a 
political settlement with the NPA since 2010. 
Ongoing negotiations for a political settlement 
with Moro Muslim rebels on the southern island 
of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago are also 
fraught with difficulties. The Moros initially rose up 
in 1968 after an alleged attempt by the Marcos 
regime to train Muslim guerrillas to infiltrate 
Malaysian Sabah, but the conflict also has roots in 
local land grabs by Christian migrants and the 
absence of effective representation of Moro in-
terests in Catholic-majority Philippines. The 
movement itself is splintered between the left-
leaning Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 
the religiously conservative Moro Islamic Libera-
tion Front (MILF) and hardline Islamist groups 
such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fight-
ers (BIFF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and local 
cells of Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Is-
lamiyah (JI). The period between 1973 and 1976 
saw the heaviest fighting, but political violence on 
the island continues to simmer. In total, the con-
flict has claimed 100,000 to 150,000 lives and 
displaced more than two million people.  26
The creation of an autonomous region for Muslim 
Moros was first proposed in 1976, but the peace 
process still faces significant hurdles due to the 
fragmented nature of the insurgency and varying 
level of demands by different insurgent groups. 
The MNLF signed a peace agreement with the 
Philippines government to form the Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1996. In 
2012, the MILF leadersh ip s igned the 
Bangsamoro Framework Agreement, which pro-
vides for a new Bangsamoro autonomous region 
with additional powers to appoint ministers, con-
trol local natural resources and administer certain 
aspects of civil law via a system of Shari’ah 
courts.  The Philippines Congress has yet to vote 27
on the accompanying bill, and it is unclear if 
Aquino can rally enough popular support in time 
for local elections in Bangsamoro to be held in 
2016. 
The peace agreement is facing increased criticism 
from two sides at the time of this writing. The 
MNLF, which was not consulted during recent 
negotiations, has declared the framework illegal. 
In two separate incidents in 2013, MNLF militants 
infiltrated Malaysian Sabah and Zamboanga City, 
indicating to the government that they still pos-
sess capabilities to destabilise the region and 
spoil a potential peace agreement. The Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philip-
pines National Police (PNP) also continue to stage 
operations in MILF territory against Islamist 
groups, including ASG, BIFF and JI, which pro-
vides additional opportunities for a potential 
breakdown. A botched March 2015 police opera-
tion against JI militants in Mamasapano, in which 
44 elite PNP commandos were killed by MILF 
forces, badly damaged the Aquino administra-
tion’s reputation and renewed calls from hardlin-
ers on both sides to throw out the current frame-
work agreement.  
After more than four decades of conflict, Min-
danao lags far behind other Philippine provinces 
in development indicators. ARMM contributes 
less than one percent to national GDP, and over 
 Ibid.25
 “Philippines-Mindanao, 1971 – first combat deaths,” Project Ploughshares, accessed 10 May 2015, http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedcon26 -
flict/philippines-mindanao-1971-first-combat-deaths/.
 Bryony Lau, “The Southern Philippines in 2013: One Step Forward, One Step Back,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2014), 261–262. For the draft 27
copy of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, see http://www.gov.ph/2014/09/10/house-bill-no-4994-bbl/.
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half its residents live below the national poverty 
line.  Ordinary Mindanaoans also face daily 28
threats of violence and extortion from local war-
lords, many of whom hold political office. The 
2009 “Maguindanao massacre,” in which candi-
date Andal Ampatuan Jr. ordered the murder of 
his electoral opponent’s family, indicates that last-
ing peace requires more than truce agreements. 
Both the Philippines government and former 
rebel leaders will need to work in tandem with 
civil society groups and the local populace to 
ensure that Mindanao builds responsible democ-
ratic institutions. Business also has a key role to 
play in investing in former conflict zones and dis-
incentivising political violence.  
❖ Geopolitical manoeuvring on the South China 
Sea. A number of factors, including China’s in-
creasing regional dominance and the U.S. “pivot 
to Asia,” have heightened tensions between 
ASEAN members and People’s Republic.  The 
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, China and 
Taiwan have maintained competing claims con-
cerning various island groups in the South China 
Sea since the close of World War II. Between 2002 
and 2009, disputes were mitigated by the ASEAN 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea, which avoided cut-and-dry questions 
of sovereignty. However, Vietnam and Malaysia 
submitted formal claims under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 
2009, triggering retaliatory claims by both the 
Philippines and China.     
In particular, both the Chinese and Philippine 
governments lay claim to members of the Spratly 
island group as well as Scarborough Shoal. A se-
ries of confrontations throughout 2011 culminat-
ed in a two-month standoff between Chinese and 
Philippine naval patrol boats in April and May of 
2012. The Philippines has approached the conflict 
on chiefly legal grounds. It filed a suit with the 
Arbitral Tribunal of UNCLOS in January 2013 re-
garding claims to the Spratly Islands, Scarbor-
ough Shoal, Mischief Reef and other land features 
within its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). The Aquino administration has also 
reached out to longtime allies, including the Unit-
ed States and Japan. It recently held joint naval 
exercises with Japan in May of 2015 and is cur-
rently negotiating a new framework agreement 
that will ensure continued U.S. maritime presence 
in the region as a counterweight to Chinese activi-
ties. Although wider regional conflict featuring 
the U.S. and Japan is unlikely, a miscalculation on 
either side could potentially escalate current ten-
sions. 
The ongoing disputes have wider implications for 
the Philippines economy. More than half of global 
maritime tonnage passes through the South Chi-
na Sea, including 41 percent of total intra-ASEAN 
trade.  The Philippines is largely dependent on 29
trade with China and its ASEAN partners, and its 
fragile economy and development agenda can-
not afford to lose these vital trade links. China in 
particular is the Philippines’ third largest trading 
partner, with bilateral trade totalling US$30 billion 
in 2007.  Throughout the 2012 standoff, China 30
made good on its threat to cancel flights to the 
Philippines and delay Philippine goods at cus-
toms, prompting Filipino agricultural lobbies to 
lodge protests with government hardliners.  The 31
Aquino administration must balance a resurgent 
nationalist sentiment against its internal economic 
interests and the profitability of its businesses. A 
major loss in Chinese trade could endanger its 
agenda of economic revitalisation, rural devel-
opment and infrastructure renovation.  
In the absence of an agreed upon multilateral 
framework for managing natural resources, the 
 “Indicators produced and compiled by the NSCB,” Philippines Statistics Authority, accessed on 10 May 2015, http://www.nscb.gov.ph/28
stattables/. 
 David Rosenberg, “Governing the South China Sea: From Freedom of the Seas to Ocean Enclosure Movements,” Harvard Asia Quarterly 29
12.3-4 (2010), 7–8.
 Renato De Castro, “The Philippines Confronts China in the South China Seas: Power Politics vs. Liberalism-Legalism,” Asian Perspective 39 30
(2015), 78. 
 Ibid., 87.31
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South China Sea marine environment will be es-
pecially vulnerable to overfishing and habitat de-
struction. The South China Sea and surrounding 
waters contain more than 30 percent of the 
world’s coral reefs.  The area is also home to ex32 -
tensive fisheries and natural gas deposits totalling 
900 trillion cubic feet.  China, Vietnam and the 33
Philippines have each unilaterally commissioned 
exploration contracts for gas and oil, while their 
fishing fleets have at times overexploited the re-
gion’s delicate fisheries. A comprehensive solu-
tion to the South China Seas disputes will require 
not only security agreements between govern-
ments, but also an area-wide environmental im-
pact assessment by private companies and envi-
ronmental organisations.  
C. Insights from the Metro Manila Lab 
❖ NGOs and traditional development initiatives 
have become collateral victims of recent middle-
class backlash against political patronage and 
pork barrel. 
Benigno Aquino III rode to nationwide victory 
largely on an anti-corruption platform endorsed 
by middle-class voters occupying the professional 
and bureaucratic sectors of Metro Manila, Cebu 
City, Davao and other major urban centres. These 
same voters demanded the dismantling of the 
culture of provincial patronage, clientelism and 
handouts practised between rural politicians and 
their electorates. In past elections, politicians have 
promised rice subsidies, tax breaks and cash 
grants to poor rural Filipinos in return for votes. 
Recent corruption scandals involving government 
development funds have severely compromised 
public perceptions of NGOs and their ability to 
solve development issues. In response, the resur-
gent middle class has included publicly-funded or 
administered social programmes in its assault 
against what it perceives as corruption and gov-
ernment waste. 
The Public Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) 
scandal dealt an enormous blow to public per-
ception of civil society in the Philippines. The 
PDAF was a discretionary fund originally intended 
to support small-scale or community in-
frastructure projects. In July 2013, business-
woman Janet Lim-Napoles and several members 
of Congress, including members of Aquino’s Lib-
eral party, were accused of funnelling over 10 
million PHP in discretionary PDAF funds into 
NGOs under their control for ersatz development 
initiatives. The resulting backlash from middle-
class demonstrators spurred the government to 
freeze the PDAF funds and institute a formal sys-
tem of certification under an independent body—
the Philippines Council for NGO Certification 
(PCNC).  
The PDAF scandal has had significant repercus-
sions for the Philippine social sector and its future 
approach to development issues. After the scan-
dal broke, the government chose to shelve its 
planned 250 million PHP “empowerment fund,” 
which would have provided human capacity de-
velopment and skills training for NGO personnel. 
More generally, the PDAF scandal has stigmatised 
the thousands of legitimate NGOs in the country. 
Philippine civil society organisations and NGOs 
attracted worldwide attention in 1986 when they 
brought the decades-old Marcos Regime to its 
knees. However, Filipino civil society is currently 
struggling under the newly-imposed certification 
procedures. Of the 250,000 registered civil soci-
ety organisations in the Philippines, only 350 to 
400 are currently PCNC certified.  Without certi34 -
fication, NGOs must pay up to a 42 percent levy 
on charitable donations. NGOs without certifica-
tion invite further stigma and struggle to find 
donors to fund programmes and organisational 
costs, including the certification process itself.  
Government-administered social programmes 
have also suffered from the PDAF scandal fallout. 
 Rosenberg, 5.32
 Beina Xu, “South China Seas Tensions,” Council on Foreign Relations, 14 May 2014, http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/33
p29790.
 Interview with Luis Morales, Executive Director of the Philippines Council for NGO Certification, conducted on 5 March 2015 in Makati.34
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Middle-class critics had expressed concern in the 
past concerning these programmes, but have 
since intensified their calls to cut government 
efforts aimed at the bottom of the pyramid. For 
instance, the Arroyo administration launched the 
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (PPPP) in 
2008 to provide supplemental income in the form 
of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) to poor Fil-
ipinos living in Geographically Isolated and Dis-
advantaged Areas (GIDA). Beneficiaries only re-
ceived funds if they sent their children to school 
and attended monthly family development ses-
sions. By 2013, the Aquino government had ex-
p a n d e d P P P P t o b e n e fi t 3 . 9 3 m i l l i o n 
households.  In spite of statements from the 35
Asian Development Bank and the World Bank 
defending the programme, critics have increas-
ingly maintained that CCTs perpetuate a culture 
of dependency and “hand out” mentality. In its 
place, they have proposed that the government 
invest in livelihood training programmes and so-
cial enterprise.  36
❖ Sentiments from middle-class Filipinos have 
encouraged the Philippine government and the 
social sector to favour market-based approaches 
to development issues. 
Since the Marcos years, the Philippine govern-
ment has experimented with market-based ap-
proaches to development issues as a counterbal-
ance to criticisms that publicly-funded pro-
grammes foster dependency and a culture of 
handouts. In 2001, it opened a proffer for gov-
ernment-backed “Poverty Eradication and Allevia-
tion Certificates,” or PEACe bonds. Proceeds from 
sales of the bonds exceeded 1.4 billion PHP, 84 
percent of which formed the endowment of the 
newly-created Peace and Equity Foundation 
(PEF).  PEF has in turn used its endowment to 37
provide loans, equity agreements and accelerator 
programmes for Philippine social enterprises.   
More recently, President Aquino’s nephew, Sena-
tor Paolo Benigno “Bam” Aquino IV, filed seven 
bills that “aim to empower the poor through jobs, 
livelihood, and access to market and opportuni-
ties.”  Among them are provisions supporting 38
SMEs, microcredit institutions and social enter-
prises. The Social Enterprise bill in particular sets 
a concrete legal definition for social businesses 
and provides tax exemptions, access to non-col-
lateralised loans and government-backed incuba-
tion to social entrepreneurs. Investors in social 
enterprises will also benefit from tax exemptions 
on investments and dividends. In a statement on 
his website, Senator Aquino clearly stated that: 
For me, inclusive growth needs to go through business. There is 
no way that we can achieve inclusive growth without engaging 
our countrymen in jobs or in enterprise building.  39
Perhaps the most prominent proponent of mar-
ket-based development is social organisation 
Gawad Kalinga (GK). Its founder, Tony Meloto, 
established GK in 1994 to build “a nation made 
up of caring and sharing communities dedicated 
to eradicating poverty and restoring human digni-
ty.”  In spite of employing some leftwing anti-40
imperialist critiques, GK espouses largely middle-
class values and attempts to impart such values to 
beneficiaries. Its primary activity, like Habitat for 
Humanity, is constructing housing for poor com-
munities. It solicits donations of building materi-
als, but it also recruits young professionals and 
Filipino-Americans to volunteer in the building 
process. These primarily middle-class volunteers 
teach “values formation” classes for the housing 
recipients and encourage them to become gain-
 Jane Parry, “Philippines: cash transfers succeeding where other programmes have failed,” The Guardian, 30 October 2013, accessed 10 35
May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/oct/30/philippines-cash-transfers-development-
impact.
 Ibid.36
 Interview with Sixto Donato C. Macasaet, Executive Director of CODE-NGO, conducted on 6 March 2015 in Quezon City.37
 “First 100 Days: Sen. Bam Champions Inclusive Growth, Reforms,” Office of Senator Bam Aquino, 10 October 2013, http://www.ba38 -
maquino.com/first-100-days-sen-bam-champions-inclusive-growth-reforms/.
 Ibid.39
 Gawad Kalinga Website, accessed 14 May 2015, http://www.gk1world.com/NewOurVision.40
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fully employed and contribute to the Philippine 
economy.  
According to the GK ethos, poverty occurs not 
because of structural issues (i.e. lack of skilled 
employment opportunities, failed land reform, 
inadequate infrastructure), but because the poor 
lack skills, self-confidence and values.  This mes41 -
sage is particularly appealing to a middle class 
weary of reading about corrupt and inefficient 
government subsidy programmes in the newspa-
per. However, it is unclear whether life skills and 
values trainings are an appropriate one-stop solu-
tion to the Philippines' massive infrastructure and 
poverty challenges. 
❖ Social businesses in the Philippines are over-
whelmingly centred around agricultural process-
es, but well placed innovation can diversify the 
sector. 
The Philippines is beset with social and environ-
mental challenges that require innovative solu-
tions that disrupt cycles of poverty and generate 
systemic change, but most Filipino social busi-
nesses are selling the same products as commer-
cial businesses, albeit at reduced returns. Of the 
five social enterprises interviewed for this study, 
four operated processing sites for products de-
rived from agricultural commodities. The Philip-
pines most widely praised social enterprise, beau-
ty company Human Nature, also manufactures 
products from ingredients grown at local farms. 
Large commercial producers of coconuts, cacao, 
sugar and lemongrass ship out raw goods for 
processing to other countries in order to reduce 
costs, but these social businesses have kept their 
processing facilities local, employing workers 
from poor rural districts or disenfranchised 
groups such as ex-criminals or the physically dis-
abled. 
Globalisation has stymied the development of 
Philippine export agriculture for the time being, 
but it has also contributed to recent gains where 
the country has comparative advantages, such as 
services and BPO. A recent Credit Suisse report 
placed only two agricultural products (crude co-
conut oil and bananas) on a list of top 20 Philip-
pine exports.  On the other hand, few-to-no 42
Philippine social businesses have developed in-
novative solutions that couple their country’s 
comparative advantages in the electronics or min-
ing industries with equitable growth and social 
change. 
The upcoming Social Enterprise Bill stipulates the 
creation of a National Center for Social Enterprise 
Development (NCSED) that will “develop and 
enhance a research and development system 
which shall equip every SE with innovative and 
sustainable approaches that ensures improve-
ment in the access to basic social services by the 
poor pursuant.”  In addition to providing capa43 -
bility training and business development as-
sistance, the centre will be in an ideal position to 
develop countrywide strategies that take advan-
tage of the Philippines native strengths. Run cor-
rectly, the NCSED can become a centre for replic-
able innovation leading to widespread and sys-
temic solutions for social and environmental ills.   
❖ Metro Manila has an increasingly socially and 
environmentally-conscious consumer base willing 
to pay a premium for local products sold by so-
cial businesses.  
The Manila public is well versed in the the social 
and environmental challenges facing their coun-
try, and social enterprises are able to exploit 
these sentiments to sustain sales in spite of in-
creased costs carried by consumers. Social enter-
prises interviewed during the Metro Manila CIL 
reported that the social enterprise label increased 
 Faith R. Kares, “Practicing Enlightened Capitalism: Fil-Am Heroes NGO Activism, and the Reconstitution of Class Difference in the Philip41 -
pines,” Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints 62.2 (2014), 195–196.
 Santitarn Sathirathai, “Philippines: What are the next big things for export?” Credit Suisse, 1 October 2012, https://plus.credit-suisse.com/42
u/cDUjsi.
 Republic of the Philippines, Cong. House of Representatives, 16th Congress, 1st Session, S 1331, An Act Ordaining the Promotion of Social 43
Enterprises to Alleviate Poverty, Establishing for the Purpose the Poverty Reduction Through Social Entrepreneurship (Present) Program and 
Providing Incentives and Benefits Therefore [received by the Philippines House of Representatives 10 July 2013], http://www.congress.gov-
.ph/download/basic_16/HB01331.pdf.   
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sales among Manila’s savvy middle class. Markets 
selling local eco-conscious produce and show-
rooms displaying socially-conscious handicrafts 
are becoming increasing commonplace in the 
capital. Because social enterprise products are 
manufactured locally, they also play to current 
nationalist sentiments among the middle class. 
Recent survey results published by market re-
search firm Nielsen reported that 63 percent of 
Asian consumers - more than on any other conti-
nent - were willing to pay extra for products or 
services from countries with positive social or en-
vironmental impact.  For middle income coun44 -
tries such as the Philippines, middle and upper-
class segments of society are becoming financial-
ly secure enough to pay these premiums. One 
social enterprise and eco-tour operator inter-
viewed in Manila, for instance, reported that more 
than 50 percent of its customers were local Fil-
ipinos. This stands in stark opposition to South-
east Asian countries with low development indica-
tors, such as Cambodia and Myanmar, where so-
cial enterprise sales are primarily generated by 
foreign tourists or expatriates. 
❖ Filipino social entrepreneurs, especially those 
without business experience, lack access to effec-
tive mentorship. 
Several social entrepreneurs interviewed de-
scribed the difficulties they experienced while 
starting their businesses and the absence of any 
mentors to turn to during the process. Of the so-
cial entrepreneurs interviewed in Metro Manila, all 
were young graduates with limited business ex-
perience. According to these entrepreneurs, de-
veloping a business concept was relatively simple. 
However, when they attempted to launch their 
businesses, they immediately ran into unantici-
pated roadblocks such as bureaucratic red tape 
and supply chain logistics.  
Once firmly established, social entrepreneurs also 
face difficult questions on how to scale their busi-
nesses. More specifically, many are unschooled in 
modern management practices and reported that 
they did not know how to “let go” or delegate 
responsibilities. All the social entrepreneurs inter-
viewed stressed their need to train middle man-
agers to take care of day-to-day business. 
Metro Manila is currently home to business 
schools such as Ideaspace, which has increasingly 
catered to social entrepreneurs, but there are few 
resources tailored specifically to their needs. 
Gawad Kalinga recently launched a social enter-
prise incubator, the Enchanted Forest, but its 
agriculture focus and limited size leaves signifi-
cant room for other training organisations to en-
ter Metro Manila’s budding social business space. 
In spite of the current popularity of social enter-
prise in the Philippines, there are few mentorship 
resources for aspiring social entrepreneurs. 
 Doing Well By Doing Good: Increasingly, consumers care about corporate social responsibility, but does concern convert to consumption? 44
(New York: Nielsen, 2014), 6.
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V. List of Organisations Interviewed 
Affordable Private Education Centers. Manila, 5 March 2015. 
Agricool. Manila, 4 March 2015. 
Ashoka Philippines. Manila, 6 March 2015. 
Ateneo School of Government (Programme in Social Entrepreneurship). Manila, 5 March 2015. 
Bambikes Revolution Cycles. Manila, 4 March 2015. 
Bayani Brew. Angat, Bulacan province, 4 March 2015. 
Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO). Manila, 6 March 2015. 
Foundation for a Sustainable Society. Manila, 4 March 2015. 
Gawad Kalinga. Angat, Bulacan province, 4 March 2015. 
GK Enchanted Farm. Angat, Bulacan province, 4 March 2015. 
GKonomics. Manila, 5 March 2015. 
Golden Duck Group. Angat, Bulacan province, 4 March 2015. 
Invisible Sisters. Manila, 5 March 2015. 
Manila Water Company Inc. Manila, 4 March 2015. 
Peace and Equity Foundation. Manila, 6 March 2015. 
Peace and Equity Holdings. Manila, 6 March 2015. 
Philippines Bases Conversion and Development Authority. Manila, 5 March 2015. 
Philippines Council for NGO Certification. Manila, 5 March 2015. 
Rare Philippines. Manila, 5 March 2015. 
VSO Bahaginan. Manila, 5 March 2015. 
 17
  
 
 18
Total Organisations Interviewed: 20 
SIO: 16 
 Nonprofits: 5 
 Social Enterprises: 5 
 Impact Investors: 1 
 Incubators: 5 
Government: 1 
Commercial: 2 
Media & Academia: 1 
ORGANISATIONS BY SECTOR
Media & Academia
1Commercial
2
Government
1
SIO
16
SIO SUB-SECTORS
Incubators
5
Impact Investors
1
Social Ent.
5
Nonprofits
5
VI. Questions for Interviewees 
Organisational History  
1) How and why was your organisation established? Is there a founding story? 
2) For international organisations – Why did your organisation decide to enter the Philippines?  
Operations  
3) On what projects are you currently working? What would success look like one year from 
now? Five years from now? 
4) How successful were your past programmes? What is your organisation doing differently 
from when it first began operations in the Philippines? 
5) Do you foresee any upcoming difficulties?  
6) What does your organisation need to make your programmes more effective?  
Strategies  
7) What are your organisation’s goals for the next 3-5 years? How do you plan to meet those 
goals? 
8) What factors might jeopardise the success of your overall strategy?  
Collaboration  
9) Were there any difficulties or pitfalls in past collaborations? Have any difficulties surfaced in 
your current collaborations?  
10) Have you collaborated with organisations outside your sector? How could such rela-
tionships be improved or facilitated?  
11) Is there any individual or organisation with whom you would like to collaborate but have 
been unable to do so?  
Human Resources  
12) Do you generally source staff locally or from overseas? Have you had any difficulties finding 
skilled local staff?  
13) Which professional skills, if any, do local staff currently lack? What do local staff need to 
succeed in today’s workplace?  
14) How would you evaluate local educational institutions in preparing future employees? Are 
there private or foreign institutions attempting to fill any gaps?  
Leadership  
15) What does effective leadership—in business, government or civil society—look like to you? 
16) What skills and resources do Filipino leaders need to better serve their society?  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17) The Institute broadly defines societal leadership as “the practice of creating sustainable 
value and impact for the betterment of society within one’s sphere of influence.” Are there 
any remarkable individuals in the Philippines whom you would consider a societal leader? 
Sustainability & CSR 
18) Does you organisation have any sustainability guidelines? How did you determine your 
current guidelines? 
19) Does your organisation engage in any Corporate Social Responsibility  (CSR) initiatives? 
Have you been able to measure the impact of your organisation’s CSR programmes? 
Funding (for civic-sector organisations) 
20) Roughly speaking, how is your organisation currently funded?  
21) How financially self-sustaining is your organisation at the moment? Do you have any plans 
to lower dependence on outside funding in the future? 
Context  
22) How does working in the Philippines differ from working in other Southeast Asian 
countries? What do the Philippines have in common with the rest of the region?  
23) How do minorities (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) fit into the landscape? Do minorities 
actively collaborate with the status quo?  
24) Outside of your own organisation’s scope, what are the key problem areas facing the 
Philippines?  
25) How are the Philippines different from five years ago? How do you imagine it will change in 
the next five years?  
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